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## ADVOCATE OF PEACE

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*It being impracticable to express in these columns the divergent views of the thousands of members of the American Peace Society, full responsibility for the utterances of this magazine is assumed by the Editor.*

## AN ALLIANCE TO ENFORCE PEACE, A WAR ALLIANCE

### Fourteen Reasons Why it is Impracticable as an Agency for International Peace

IN THE second paragraph of his letter of March 8 to Senator Hitchcock, President Woodrow Wilson pleads for an alliance to enforce peace among the nations. He says:

"There is no escaping the moral obligations which are expressed in positive terms in this article [article 10] of the Covenant. We won a moral victory over Germany far greater even than the military victory won on the field of battle, because the opinion of the whole world swung to our support and the support of the nations associated with us in the great struggle. It did so because of our common profession and promise that we meant to establish 'an organization of peace which should make it certain that the combined power of free nations would check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which *all must submit* and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned *shall be sanctioned*.' This promise and assurance were written into the preliminaries of the armistice and into the preliminaries of the peace itself and constitute one of the most sacred obligations ever assumed by any nation or body of nations. It is unthinkable that America should set the example of ignoring such a solemn moral engagement."

The spirit of this paragraph shows that Mr. Wilson looks upon the Covenant of the League of Nations as a League to Enforce Peace, "a definite tribunal of opinion to which *all must submit* and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall *be sanctioned*." True, the phrase "tribunal of opinion" is an obscure one; but the words "must submit" and "sanctioned" are definite words in international law and practice. With an indirection not wholly complimentary to the judgment of the people, Mr. Wilson has persistently refused definitely to describe his proposed League of Nations as a League to Enforce Peace. But if after reading this quotation there should be any doubt left in our minds, it is clear that Mr. Wilson utterly removes it later in the same letter, in which he fervently favors that we "contribute our overwhelming moral and material forces to the establishing of an international régime in which our own ideals of justice and right *may be made to prevail*." Surely that language is unmistakable. We are now aware that our President proposes an alliance of nine powers dominated by five men to enforce peace among the nations. We might have known this, for Article X of the Covenant is an appeal to naked force; and long ago the President told us in Paris that "force" is there in the Covenant, "in the background," but there.

Our judgment always has been, and still is, that any such solution of the problem of international peace is impossible. We hold to this view because of certain definite reasons—reasons which we have tried to express from time to time, but reasons which evidently need to be expressed frequently.

Our first reason for believing such a scheme to be impracticable, and therefore impossible, is that if the United States should become a party to such an alliance—we call it an alliance because it is in no sense a league of the nations—it by that act agrees to the establishment of an international body, to which body will be given power, and that with the consent of the United States, to wage war not only against our enemies, but against the United States. It is inescapable that if we can enforce peace there, they can enforce peace here; and that, be it said again, with the advice and consent of the United States. Speaking in the New York Convention and urging the ratification of the Constitution, Mr. Alexander Hamilton asked, "Can we believe that one State will ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument

of coercion? The thing is a dream, it is impossible." Since it is not reasonable to expect that the United States Senate or any other body of intelligent Americans would agree to such an unlimited super-organization, making the United States "an instrument of coercion," we believe the whole scheme to be impracticable.

Our second reason for believing such an alliance to be impracticable lies in the fact that the United States Supreme Court, itself an international court in all issues joined between States, and therefore our one great object-lesson, does not find it necessary or possible to enforce its decrees against individual States. Its decrees against the States are enforced, however, and that by virtue of the only sanction outside the sanction of war in issues between States, namely, the sanction of public opinion. The armies of the United States have no relation to the findings of the United States Supreme Court as against States. There is no potential force behind the Supreme Court of the United States in its decisions against States, except the force of public opinion; and that force we find to be quite adequate. Any other force is unthinkable. Since peace is maintained thus between forty-eight States in America, and since wisdom has been unable to devise any other successful way of maintaining peace between States, again the inescapable conclusion must be that any alliance to enforce peace between States is unthinkable.

Our third reason for believing the scheme of an alliance to enforce peace among nations to be impracticable is that all such plans, including this Paris plan, overlook the fact that the teachings of all history and of all political science demonstrate the necessity for first establishing a lawmaking organ before setting up an executive with power to wage war upon States. Offensive and defensive alliances are the methods of war; they cannot be the ways of peace. In that one great permanently successful international conference of 1787, the first task of the fathers was to provide for a legislative body. The international conferences of 1899 and 1907 at The Hague were in nature legislative. Any successful judicial or executive arm of the nations must be established by the methods of legislation. Since this proposal out of Paris plans to reverse the historical methods of justice, by beginning with force rather than law, it is both impracticable and impossible.

Our fourth reason is that an international force may, and in all probability will be found to be quite unnecessary when once an international legislature and an international court, both pleaded for by William Ladd nearly a century ago, and all but realized at The Hague, are really evolved and put to work. To quote again from Hamilton, "to coerce the States is one of the maddest

projects that was ever devised." The history of American political achievement shows this to have been the outcome in the great international experiment most familiar to us, a method by which peace is maintained between forty-eight free, sovereign, and independent States, and that without coercion.

Our fifth reason is that the World War, as in the case of all wars, proves conclusively that preparedness to use force does not necessarily operate in time of international crises to restrain nations from going to war. There is no difference between co-operative force and competitive force, because co-operative force is wholly unnecessary except as it be planned for competitive use. Any alliance, therefore, to enforce peace is a menace to peace; for, as Mr. Madison wrote in May, 1787, "the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice, and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually. A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction."

Our sixth reason for believing this alliance to enforce peace to be impracticable lies in the fact that our Federal Constitution would have first to be modified in so many particulars that the people of the United States would not submit to it. For example, article 1, section 8, of our Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to "declare war," "raise and support armies," and that the Congress shall have the power to provide for calling forth the militia to "repel invasion." When we recall that this proposed alliance to enforce peace might be directed against us, it is manifest that before we could approve of delegating this authority of Congress to a group outside the United States, that this section of our Constitution would have to be changed.

Our seventh reason is that the same Constitution further provides, in article 3, section 3, that "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," and that, therefore, before the Congress could grant to an outside body of men the authority to levy war against this country, or to adhere to our enemies, giving them aid and comfort, it would be necessary, if Congress would avoid the crime of treason, to change this section of our Constitution.

Our eighth reason is based upon article 4, section 4, of this instrument, which provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion." Since this is so, before we could delegate to an outside body of men the authority, under any circumstances whatsoever, to invade a State of the American Union, and that is what an alliance to enforce

peace must necessarily mean, it would be necessary to revise this section of our Constitution.

Our ninth reason rests upon article 2, section 2, of our Constitution, which provides that "the President of the United States shall have power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." Since it has been held that the treaty-making power does not extend to the point of destroying the fundamental laws of the land, that a treaty to annihilate the sovereignty of the American people or to deprive them of their constitutional powers would be void, it would be necessary to change our Constitution here also before we could expect the United States Senate to ratify by a two-thirds vote any plan which contemplates such a fundamental change in our whole political structure as proposed in this covenant to enforce peace. Before such an international alliance could be approved by the United States it would, therefore, be necessary to change the Constitution probably in other, but certainly in these four, particulars.

Our tenth reason is that the proposed alliance to enforce peace comes before us upon the assumption that the people of the United States, through their representatives in the United States Senate, can be prevailed upon to accept a scheme which will thus materially curtail the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, subordinate that body to an alliance known to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, and change both in fact and in theory the form and substance of this great, successful American Republic.

Our eleventh reason is that the advocates of such an international organization of force as a means of restricting wars do not seem to realize that the whole conception of it is very old, and that it has never been seriously or popularly received. Mr. Wilson himself says that "it is a new doctrine in world affairs." And yet there were the "Greek councils"; there was Dante's proposal of world federation backed by force in the 14th century; there was the Great Design, attributed to Henry IV of France, embodying the same principles, in 1601; there was, a few years later, Hugo Grotius suggesting the importance of "certain congresses of Christian powers in which the controversies among some of them may be decided by others who are interested, and in which measures may be taken to *compel the parties* to accept peace upon equitable terms"; there was William Penn's plan of 1693, proposing an international force for the maintenance of peace in Europe; there were Saint Pierre and Jean Jacques Rousseau with similar plans in the early 18th century; there was Robert Stewart, better known as Viscount Castlereagh, who went to the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815, for the purpose of establishing an armed

concert of Europe. The proposal seems, therefore, to be both old and discredited.

Our twelfth reason is, not that such a plan strikes at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine; not that it does violence to our ancient policy of avoiding entangling alliances—we could well afford to give up both of these for the peace of the world—but it is that an international force such as is here contemplated makes the solution of the problem of war more difficult by subverting the logic of history, by complicating the whole situation with a threatening factor quite unknown and quite unnecessary; for, again to quote Mr. Madison, "the practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies had been exploded on all hands."

Our thirteenth reason is that the advocates of such an international menace ignore the fact that it is not fear, but justice, that paves the way for peace; that it is not chimeras, but the centripetal forces of an enlightened self-interest, that really count, personally, nationally, internationally—a self-interest sufficiently enlightened to place rights and duties in harmonious relation.

And, finally, our fourteenth and last reason is that it is the efficiency of public opinion, generally granted to be the ultimate executive force behind all law, that executive to which Cicero referred as "Queen of the World," which must be relied upon to organize the nations unto their peace and safety. Cardinal Fleury, prime minister to Louis XV of France, when presented with the scheme for world peace proposed by Saint Pierre, is said to have pleasantly remarked, that the document should have a preliminary article providing for the education of missionaries "to dispose the hearts of the princes of Europe to submit to such a diet." This discriminating suggestion of the experienced prime minister seems to suggest still further the insurmountable difficulties in the way of establishing any hopeful international alliance to enforce a world peace.

### THE PRESIDENT'S MISTAKE

WE ARE forced to think on Mr. Wilson's mistakes, not because Mr. Wilson makes them, but because they have threatened the thing with which we are most vitally concerned, namely, an effective Society of Nations. While the President's mistakes have been very many, there is one outstanding and particularly harmful. We do not refer to his extra-constitutional assumption of the duties of a plenipotentiary at Paris. We do not refer to his inexcusable attempt to differentiate between "legal" and "moral" responsibilities. We do not refer to his fallacious reasoning in the interest of an impossible League to Enforce Peace. We are not